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Abstract This study examines a hot spot policing intervention where private security
guards patrolled a specific area in the city centre of a mid-sized Swedish town during
summer weekend evenings and nights, aiming to reduce the number of reported street
violence incidents. A follow-up of the intervention, using previous years as a control was
conducted to measure changes in the number of street violence rates before and during the
intervention. The results show non-significant decreases in the number of reported street
violence incidents during the intervention. The results can be interpreted in at least two
ways: that the intervention had no effects; or that the small, but non-significant decreases
observed, are indeed small effects that can be strengthened by modifying the implementation
of the intervention. An additional analysis shows that the changes in crime rates are
larger at times when the guards adapted a stricter hot spot policing approach, which
indicates that with a more structured implementation of the intervention it might be
possible to see larger effects.
Keywords City centre . Directed patrol . Hot spot policing . Private security guards . Public
places . Street violence
Introduction
During the past decades different approaches for preventing crime, focusing on high crime
places rather than on criminally active individuals have emerged. One such approach is so
called hot spot policing. This approach implicates that interventions are directed at small
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geographical places, such as addresses or street segments, with relatively high crime rates
(Braga and Weisburd 2010b; Groff et al. 2010; Spelman 1995). There are several different
methods for doing hot spot policing, methods like increasing the presence of uniforms
(directed patrol), raids or making physical changes in a place (Braga 2001; Taylor et al.
2011). The present study is a follow-up of a hot spot policing intervention using increased
patrolling by private security guards in order to prevent street violence in the city centre of a
medium-sized Swedish city.1 The main objective is to see whether the number of reported
street violence decreases during the intervention as this was the purpose of the intervention.
Several attempts using patrolling security personnel in efforts aiming to reduce alcohol-
related violence and disorder in city centres have been implemented in Swedish cities
throughout the past decades. There are, however, no proper effect evaluations of these
attempts reviewed and published internationally. Consequently, there are yet no conclusions
to be drawn concerning the effectiveness of the use of security guards in order to prevent
friction violence in city centres in Swedish conditions. Also, research results from hot spot
policing interventions in general are scarce outside America, and directed patrol by security
guards in particular, is a rare preventive measure in this area of research.
Targeting Problems and Places
It is not a new assertion that the distribution of crime varies between cities, neighbourhoods
or districts. Shaw and McKay (1942) concentrated on one, in particular, influential pattern
concerning the importance of places in criminological research, namely that crime rates in
different neighbourhoods tended to be stable over time. Today, criminological theories still
stress the importance of this fact, taking the knowledge a step further in looking at the
distribution of crime on a micro-level, focusing on small geographical units of analysis such
as specific addresses or street segments (Braga and Weisburd 2010b; Groff et al. 2010; Eck
and Weisburd 1995; Spelman 1995). Later studies have shown that variations in crime rates
exist not only between neighbourhoods or districts, but that large differences can be seen
even within a limited area. Small areas with consistently high crime rates have been
identified (Sherman et al. 1989; Weisburd et al. 2004; Weisburd and Green 1995), showing
that a small amount of places account for a large amount of crime reported in a city or a
neighbourhood (Sherman et al. 1989). When crime rates in small places, so called micro-
places, are relatively high in relation to crime rates in the city, neighbourhood or district
where this place is located, these places are also referred to as hot spots of crime (Braga and
Weisburd 2010b; Eck and Weisburd 1995; Groff et al. 2010; Spelman 1995). The knowledge
of micro-places of crime has resulted in a new idea concerning “criminal careers of places”
(see e.g. Braga and Weisburd 2010b; Eck and Weisburd 1995; Groff et al. 2010; Spelman
1995), serving as a foundation for crime prevention measures aimed at places. The relation
between places and crime has repeatedly been scientifically established and has resulted in
an increasing use of place-based crime prevention methods. Theories about “criminal career
of places” (Braga and Weisburd 2010a; Sherman 1995; Sherman et al. 1989; Spelman 1995;
Weisburd et al. 2004) imply that some places naturally provide better conditions for criminal
activities than others, depending on factors like the physical formations of the place (e.g.
dark corners versus well lit places) and absence or presence of certain elements (e.g. people
1 We consider the intervention a hot spot policing intervention as the target is very specific places with high
crime rates and because the security guards have similar rights to intervene as the public police. See further
description of the intervention later in the text.
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or cameras that increase the perceived risk of getting caught). The idea of focusing crime
prevention efforts on places derives from assumptions about how people go about in their
everyday life and the ways in which people make rational decisions based on the conditions
present in the surroundings (Clarke and Cornish 1985; Cohen and Felson 1979). Thus, the
dynamics of a place is pivotal when designing place-based crime prevention interventions.
What elements in the immediate vicinity might influence people’s decision to commit a
crime? How can the settings be manipulated in order to prevent crime?
Violent crime, in particular street violence, which is the crime type of interest in this
study, is an example of how crime often clusters in space and time, creating hot spots.
Clustering of street violence particularly occurs in areas encircling many entertainment
establishments such as restaurants, pubs and nightclubs (Block and Block 1995; Brå 2011;
Roncek and Maier 1991; Wikström 1995). As such, alcohol-related street violence is a type
of crime that is highly dependent on location (in or around alcohol-serving establishments)
and should therefore be likely to gain from the use of place-based crime prevention methods.
The Example of Street Violence in City Centres
Street violence, i.e. physical assaults or battery taking place out in the streets in public places
is a type of violent crime that commonly occurs in city centres in relation to night time
establishments serving alcohol. City centres, because of the large amounts of drinking
establishments, such as pubs and restaurants and nightclubs, create consistent circumstances
for violent crime as they on a regular basis attract a significant quantity of people as well as
contributing to the alcohol intoxication level (c.f. Block and Block 1995; Eck and Weisburd
1995; Eisner and Wikström 1999; McMurran 1999; Wikström 1995).
Street violence in relation to alcohol-serving establishments is often dependent on the
situation, and has previously been referred to as friction violence. Friction occurs in
situations where people interact and someone perceives that they are being interfered by
others, and as a result feel provoked. In these situations alcohol intoxication often work as a
facilitator of violence (see e.g. Chermack and Giancola 1997; Collin and Schlenger 1988;
McMurran 1999). As a result of situations where friction occurs, aggression and even
violence can emerge (Wikström and Treiber 2009). Areas with many alcohol-serving
establishments in combination with people consuming alcohol can, and will, cause these
situations of friction, frustration, aggression, and in extension even violence, to occur in
public places (Block and Block 1995; Eck and Weisburd 1995; Eisner and Wikström 1999;
McMurran 1999; Wikström 1995). This, in theory, makes public places in relation to these
types of establishments well suited for place-based interventions aiming to reduce street
violence, as we know when and where situations of friction very likely will arise.
Hot Spot Policing
Hot spot policing, i.e. focusing various crime preventive efforts on small, micro-level places,
is an approach for crime prevention efforts that in the literature seems promising, but not
without exceptions. Hot spot policing shows fairly positive outcomes on reducing social
disorder and crime, as several studies on this already widely spread policing approach states
that focused police interventions seems to be effective for controlling social order, prevent-
ing crime and to ensure public safety (Braga 2001, 2005; Braga and Bond 2008; Braga et al.
1999; Braga and Weisburd 2011; Weisburd and Eck 2004). In seven out of nine studies
selected for a Campbell Collaboration review (Braga 2001, 2005) substantial reductions of
crime and disorder in hot spots were established. The review displays various hot spot
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policing tactics for addressing high crime places (hot spots), for example tactics like directed
patrol (increased presence of uniforms, i.e. police or security guards), place managing, traffic
stops and raids (see e.g. Braga and Weisburd 2010b; Taylor et al. 2011; Weisburd and Braga
2006). The studies in the Campbell Collaboration review (Braga 2001) showed support for
various tactics used in hot spot policing. Directed patrol has had significant effects on all
crime in a hot spot with between a 6 and 13 % larger decrease in crime rates in targeted areas
compared to control areas (Sherman and Weisburd 1995). Hot spot policing also has had
effects on drug related crime. Decreases with as much as 92 % larger decreases in interven-
tion areas than in a non-equivalent control area has been detected (Smith 2001). Also, frisks
(i.e. searching peoples outer clothing for contraband, such as guns or drugs) during traffic
stops decreased gun crime with 49 %, compared with a non-equivalent control beat
(Sherman et al. 1995). However, there are examples where hot spot policing efforts, despite
the previously demonstrated crime preventive effects, have not proved useful. While pre-
senting significant effects on crime in general as a result of a directed patrol intervention, the
results of the Minneapolis Hot Spots Patrol Program (Sherman and Weisburd 1995) also
described the detected decreases as “modest” with reductions in crime calls ranging from 6
to 13 %. The Minneapolis RECAP program (Sherman et al. 1989) showed no significant
reductions in calls for service to the police as a result of problem-oriented interventions in
hot spots, and no noteworthy differences in crime calls were detected in an Australian hot
spot intervention using POP interventions (Criminal Justice Commission 1998). Hence, hot
spot policing approaches apparently display varying results in research. It is also essential to
note that the main part of previous studies has been conducted in larger cities, mostly in
America, and that the generalizability to other countries and smaller cities is less clear. In
summary, hot spot policing appears to be a versatile crime prevention method useful in
various situations and on various types of crime, with some exceptions. As research results
are not consistent, and in some contexts even lacking, more research is needed in order to
establish what types of interventions are useful on what types of crime and in what context.
Directed Patrol and Violent Crime
One commonly applied method in the hot spot policing approach is directed patrol, i.e.
increased presence of uniforms, such as police or security guards, in a place. Studies on
directed patrol and alcohol-related violent crimes, which is the focus of the present study,
are, however, hard to find. Existing studies of alcohol and violence are often focused on the
relation between the two (Block and Block 1995; Chermack and Giancola 1997; Graham et
al. 1998; Plant et al. 1977), on crimes committed inside pubs and clubs rather than outside in
public places (Homel and Clark 1994), or on interventions targeting alcohol-related violent
crime through information campaigns and education for staff and security personnel to
encourage responsible beverage serving and to handle public intoxication among people
(Felson et al. 1997; Homel and Clark 1994; Homel et al. 1997).
Directed patrol in hot spots of crime has shown mixed results in regards to crime
prevention. Some evaluations have been carried out on directed patrol in micro places, some
of them targeting violent crime in large. Significant reductions of crime and disorder in
general (calls for service) in hot spots due to increased police presence have been established
(Ratcliffe et al. 2010; Sherman and Weisburd 1995). In Philadelphia, a directed patrol
intervention resulted in a 23 % larger decrease of violent crime in the intervention hot spots
than in the control hot spots (Ratcliffe et al. 2010). One further conclusion from this
randomized controlled study is that violent crime in a hot spot needs to initially reach a
threshold level in order to display statistically significant results of any intervention. In the
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Philadelphia case, the threshold was found to be six reported violent crimes in a three month-
period (Ratcliffe et al. 2010). With regards to these results, the researchers discuss the
importance of dosage and spatial concentration in relation to intervention effectiveness,
stating that if these elements are fundamental for a place-based intervention to have positive
effects on crime, larger areas and/or a low number of officers patrolling a given area might
reduce the effectiveness (Ratcliffe et al. 2010). In Flint, Michigan, foot patrols were
implemented on a macro-level, in a number of neighbourhoods, as opposed to targeting
smaller, micro-places which is the case in hot spot policing, in order to reduce crime in
general (Trojanowicz 1986). The results indicated that the intervention had positive effects
on both crime and feelings of safety in the included neighbourhoods, but with substantially
weaker effects on reported crime in comparison to previously mentioned evaluations,
showing a decrease of mere 8.7 % in intervention areas, compared to non-equivalent control
areas (Trojanowicz 1986). It might be feasible to relate the results of the Flint study to the
increased size of the intervention area, as micro-level interventions tend to show larger
decreases of reported crimes (Ratcliffe et al. 2010). This assumption might be particularly
true if adopting the micro-level approach that hot spot policing build its foundation upon.
There are also studies that show small, non-significant decreases in crime rates, due to
directed patrol interventions. An evaluation of a 90-day directed patrol intervention aiming
to prevent street violence in Jackson, Florida (Taylor et al. 2011) assigned 120 identified hot
spots to 60 patrols 5 days a week. Other hot spots, divided into two other groups, received a
problem-oriented intervention or a control condition of no intervention. This study measured
crime rates during the intervention period and for a 90-day post-test period, looking at
residual effects on crime rates in the included hot spots after the intervention. The results
showed a decrease of violence in the directed patrol-hot spots, compared to the control area,
ranging from 4 to 20 % during the post-test period, but the results were not statistically
significant (Taylor et al. 2011). Several feasible reasons for the modest results of the directed
patrol interventions were discussed, reasons such as officers straying from their patrol area,
the limited intervention period, and varying dosage of patrol. The expressive nature of
violent crime is mentioned as a possible contributing factor to weaker effects of place-based
interventions (Taylor et al. 2011). This suggestion can also be related to the weaker effects of
interventions targeting violent crimes in the Campbell Collaboration review (Braga 2001,
2005). In a Philadelphia study officers were placed in hot spots 24 h a day 7 days a week for
4 months as a mean to prevent drug-related and violent crimes (Lawton et al. 2005). The
intervention showed mixed results. In the respective neighbourhoods the effects of the
intervention proved to be statistically significant, but the intervention had no apparent effects
on the city’s overall drug or violent crime statistics.
With regards to the discussions about dosage of patrol, a study has also been conducted on
the necessary amount of police presence in hot spots in order to achieve preventive effects
(Koper 1995), based on data from observations during a one-year intervention in Minneapolis
(see the Minneapolis Preventive Patrol Experiment, Sherman and Weisburd 1995). Dosage of
police presence was divided into categories created from time spent in hot spots and the related
effects on crime calls, and then comparing the results to those of a drive-by patrol. The results
indicated that between 11 and 15min is the ideal time spent in a hot spot of crime (Koper 1995).
The conclusions are that patrol stops reaching the threshold level of 11 min leads to statistically
significant residual deterrence, i.e. longer time periods without disorder, in comparison with
drive-by patrols. Also, after 15 min the effects of police presence seems to not be statistically
significant in comparison to those of a drive-by (Koper 1995).
The varying research results concerning hot spot policing and directed patrol illustrates
the potential of the method, but a need for more knowledge also emerges. Hot spot policing
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seems to be a versatile approach for preventing crime useful in various contexts and on
various types of crime. However, as these positive results are not without reservation,
particularly concerning directed patrol and violent crime, more knowledge is needed to
establish the usefulness of this kind of intervention in different contexts.
Aim of the Present Study
Existing research on hot spot policing and directed patrol tells us that there is a lot of potential in
these crime prevention approaches. However, gaps in this knowledge emerge when looking
closely at different methods in relation to different crime types and different contexts. There is
still much to find out of what works, under what circumstances and for whom. It is therefore
desirable to continue testing directed patrol interventions in different contexts and on different
types of crime. The objective of this study was to evaluate a hot spot policing intervention
implemented in the city centre of the Swedish city of Örebro, called the §3 project,2 which
through directed patrol by uniformed private security guards aimed to reduce street violence.
Implementation of the §3-project
The run time of the §3 project was set to the first weekend of June through the last weekend
of September the years of 2010 and 2011. The intervention consisted of private security
guards (PSG’s) patrolling a limited area (0.7 km2 or 1/4 mi2) encompassing several known
hot spots of street violence within the city centre of Örebro, Fridays and Saturdays between
8 p.m. and 4 a.m. Initially 20 guards of different ethnic backgrounds, four women and 16
men, were recruited for participation in the project. Sixteen guards (two women) in total
executed the intervention patrolling four at the time, in pairs of two, each work session.
Settings
Nightclubs and bars (see the smaller dots in the map in Fig. 1.) in Örebro open at different times
during the night, but close simultaneously at 2 a.m., leaving large amounts of people lingering
in the streets waiting for transportation or food from late-night restaurants. There are also a few
main hot spots for street violence according to police crime statistics within the intervention
area. The larger dots on the map in Fig. 1 mark main hot spots of street violence in Örebro city,
squares adjacent to nightclubs, pubs, night-open restaurants and bus stops (c.f. Brå 2011).
Instructions
The PSG’s were instructed to be visible, focus on positive relations with the public and to
interfere when needed, in order to prevent violent crime and fend disorderly behaviour. In
order to achieve visibility the guards wore reflective vests, with “security guard” printed in
large letters, and their ordinary badges with tag numbers. However, the PSG’s received no
particular instructions prior to the intervention concerning for example, the patrol routes
during the night, or on how much time should be spent in each hot spot or part of the
intervention area. The only clear structure in when the guards were supposed to patrol in a
specific location was at the nightclubs’ closing hour each work session. All nightclubs in
2 The project is named after §3 in the Security Stewards Code [Lag (1980:578) om ordningsvakter], the
section that regulates the guards’ authority to patrol and intervene within a specific area.
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Örebro close simultaneously at 2 a.m., sending large amounts of people out into the streets at
the same time. By placing themselves in strategic places at closing time the PSG’s and the
police aimed to cover as many of the hot spots as possible at this time. How this was to be
executed was decided from work session to work session as the guards, and any available
police patrols, were positioned in set locations when the nightclubs closed, based on the
amount of patrons in each place and other factors that (according to their experience) could
be an indicator of trouble later on.
One minor difference in the implementation occurred between 2010 and 2011, as in 2011
one pair of guards got access to bicycles in order to move fast when called for, and to more
quickly be able to cover large areas in preventive purposes. However, the bicycles were
according to the head of the PSG’s not used at all in any situations of disorder or violence,
but merely made the patrolling a bit swifter in the calmer parts of the intervention area.
Private Security and the Police in Sweden It is not unusual for the police to employ private
security agents for crime preventive purposes (Berkley and Thayer 2000). In Sweden, the
kind of private security guards used in this project work in close relation to the police at all
times, the police being the responsible authority. They receive special, mandatory training
Fig. 1 Map of intervention area with hot spots
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and education from the police authorities, and wear badges with tag numbers. The police is
always in charge for PSG’s on duty, and the guards report back to the police by the end of
each work session. Their work is regulated primarily by the Security Stewards Code (SSC)
as well as by some sections from the Swedish Police Act. The Police Act mainly regulates
the PSG’s right to wear (and use) arms, such as truncheons, and their authority to remove
and apprehend threats to the law and social order. The SSC also stipulates that the guards
may be assigned to work in this manner within different areas and establishments, for
example in courts, nightclubs, locations for sport and music events and so on. Section 3
of the Security Stewards Code states that the police can, when needed, also grant the PSG’s
authority to work in areas not mentioned previously in the SSC, such as in our case the entire
city centre. Bars, pubs and nightclubs, usually have their own PSG’s of this particular type
(bouncers) hired, that have the right to intervene inside, and directly outside the entrance of,
their nightclub. Their authorization, however, stretches no further than that (c.f. Berkley and
Thayer 2000). Thus, the guards commissioned within the §3 project were used as a complement
to the nightclub PSG’s, as they were authorized to intervene only outdoors within the desig-
nated area in the city centre, and not inside any sort of business establishment.
Method
Research Design
We did a follow-up study, comparing crime rates (physical assaults outdoor reported to the
police) in the intervention area during the intervention, that is, for June through September
2010 and 2011 between 8 p.m. and 4 a.m. Friday and Saturday nights (the intervention
period), with the crime rates of the corresponding period and times of the years 2008 and
2009. Importantly, during 2008 and 2009, no intervention was implemented in this area.
Sample and Data
The type of crime measured was street violence (physical assaults committed outdoors)
within a specific area (the intervention area) in the city centre during the times of the guards’
work sessions, Fri-Sat nights 8 p.m. – 4 a.m. This crime type was selected as i) it was a main
purpose of the intervention to reduce violence in the city centre in relation to opening hours
of night-time establishments (this was a decision taken by officers of the municipality of the
city of Örebro) and ii) the PSG’s were only authorized to intervene outdoors and therefore
had no possibility (or purpose) to prevent crime inside any of the bars or nightclubs.
Street Violence in Örebro
In Sweden, during 2009, almost half (49.5 %) of all reported physical assaults against people
over the age of 18, took place outdoors (Brå 2010). Between the years of 2005 and 2009,
about 3200 street violence crimes were reported to the police in the entire municipality of
Örebro. About 44 % these incidents were committed during Friday and Saturday nights
between 8 p.m. and 4 a.m., and almost 30 % of all reported assaults were committed in the
city centre (1.6 % of the city areal), thus creating a hot spot of street violence. Örebro is a
medium-sized Swedish city covering an area of 16.5 square miles, with 107,000 inhabitants
of the 630 square miles and 135,000 inhabitants that make up the entire municipality of
Örebro, with a city centre that encompasses roughly 1/4 of a square mile. The crime statistics
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for Örebro presented above correspond well with Swedish physical assault crime rates in
general (Eksten 2009). A recent report from the Swedish National Council of Crime
Prevention (Brå 2011) confirms the existence of hot spots of street violence in Swedish
cities, with two to five hot spots with between 26 and 58 % of all reported street violence in
the cities examined.
The above numbers show that a large part of all street violence is reported during a very
limited time period in a year. Nearly half (44 %) of all street violence is committed Friday
and Saturday nights, during June through September, which in other words means that half
of all reported street violence is committed in 9.5 % of the entire year. Also, research shows
that violent crime tends to increase with warm weather (Cohn 1990, 1996; Rotton and Cohn
2000). This relationship might depend on several various behaviour patterns that change in
relation to the weather, such as alcohol-consumption and increased social interaction. It is
feasible to assume, that in countries like Sweden, where climatic variables such as temper-
ature and rain or snow fall vary substantially over the year, this relationship might very well
be true. This implicates that months of summer should make up hot times, so to speak, and
that this period of the year is well-suited for implementing interventions targeting violent
crime in public places in Sweden. Because of the lower crime rates during the rest of the
year, other time periods than summer were concluded to be irrelevant for comparison. This
was the main reason why the intervention period was compared to the corresponding period
of previous years, rather than to the months immediately preceding or following the
intervention, i.e. a before-after comparison.
Statistical Analyses
The groups for comparison in this study consist of all weekends between the first weekend
of June until the last weekend of September 2008–2011, a total of 68 weekends (N=68,
08/09 n=34, 10/11 n=34). Even though the crime rates were measured for the exact same
areas before and during the intervention, the actual weekends measured differ between the
years. Therefore, we chose to treat the intervention group (the weekends of 2010/2011) and
the pre-test group (the weekends of 2008/2009) as two independent groups, rather than one
and the same group as object for pre- and “during”3-test. Hence, we performed an
independent-sample t-test in order to test for changes in crime rates between the two
“groups”. The weekends of 2008 and 2009 thus made up one group and the weekends of
2010 and 2011 (intervention period) the other group.
In order to conduct a t-test the observations in the groups need to be independent of each
other. When comparing crime rates per night in any given week it is highly possible that the
number of reported crimes during Friday night correlates with the number of reported crimes
during Saturday night, making the observations dependent of each other. There is, however,
no reason to believe that this correlation remains over longer time. So, to avoid the risk of the
observations being dependent, we used number of reported street violence per weekend as
the dependent variable, thus measuring Fridays and Saturdays together. A small part, 4.4 %
of the reported crimes in the original data set had to be excluded as information of time
and/or place for the incident was not documented.
Possible Confounders We considered some likely confounders. We tested correlation be-
tween weather (temperature, rainfall and air humidity) and number of reported street
3 No post-test was conducted as the intervention period is limited to certain months of the year and the feasible
time period for a post-test would be the corresponding period of 2012 (without intervention).
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violence. Also, the number of establishments with alcohol serving permits within the
intervention area was compared over the years. Lastly, we looked at disturbances (construc-
tion work) that took place in one of the main hot spots during the entire summer of 2010.
The constructions work meant that bus stops, and the otherwise natural flow of people,
moved away from the hot spot, which could imply that fewer violent crimes would be
committed here, as the number of both potential targets and potential offenders decreased,
and with it the risk of friction.
Results
The graph in Fig. 2 illustrates the means of the numbers of street violence crimes reported in
Örebro during summer weekend evenings and nights between the years of 2005 and 2011. It
also shows the distribution of these crimes between §3 area (the intervention area) and the
rest of Örebro municipality, outside the intervention area.
As seen in Fig. 2, in the §3 area, the crime rates have fluctuated since 2005. A decrease in
reported violence occurs, and remains, in this intervention area during the intervention
periods in 2010 and 2011. However, in the §3 area, the lowest levels of street violence
reported, prior to the intervention years, was in 2007 and 2008. If lower crime rates than
those of 2007 and 2008 were to be reported in 2010 and 2011 (i.e. during the intervention),
this would indicate that the intervention might have affected the levels of reported crime.
However, as seen in Fig. 1 this is not the case. As for the rest of Örebro municipality, the
crime rate increases between 2006 and 2010, and decreases in 2011.
The results of the t-test, (t(66)=1.07, p>0.05, d=.47, 95 % CI [−.41, 1.35]), shows that
no significant decreases in reported street violence can be ascertained between the two
periods of measurement. The d illustrates the mean difference between the two periods and
CI shows the upper and lower confidence intervals of the t-value with a confidence level of










2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
§3 area Örebro municipality outside §3 area  
Fig. 2 Number of reported street violence (means) during weekend evenings and nights June-September
2005–2011
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assaults between the two groups (2008/2009 and 2010/2011), but the decrease is not
statistically significant.
Considering Potential Confounders
To consider possible confounders, we correlated number of reported street violence and
weather (rainfall, temperature and air humidity) for each year 2008 through 2011, which
showed no significant correlations. Thus, it was not necessary to control for this when
conducting the main analysis. The number of establishments with alcohol serving permits
within the intervention area did not change notably during the years of control, between
2009 and 2011.4 The occasional permit was approved, or in some cases retracted, during this
period, but these minor changes did not affect the distribution of nightclubs nor the number
of valid permits overall, and can therefore be said not to have affected the outcome of this
study. Construction work in one of the main hot spots during the summer of 2010 was
considered to be a disturbance of the natural flow of people as bus stops were moved during
this period. Therefore, for the last analysis, we calculated the share of reported street
violence committed at this hot spot in question in relation to all committed street violence
in the §3 area over the years, which showed no apparent effects on number of reported
crimes. Based on these findings we did not test for any of these confounders in our
main analyses.
Evidence of Effects When Patrolling was More Structured?
A supplementary analysis was conducted breaking down results to see if differences were
larger at some points during the PSG’s work sessions. With the increased structure in the
implementation at closing time (2 a.m.), when the guards were deliberately stationed to
cover as many hot spots as possible at once, and with the increased number of people in the
streets at this hour, the change in crime rates could prove to be larger than the overall change
during the intervention, if the PSG’s presence actually have effects. That is, differences in
crime rates between the two groups, 08/09 and 10/11, could be larger at certain expected
time points during the nights. Hence, we divided the work sessions into separate hours (8.
p.m.–8.59 p.m. = hour 1, 9.p.m.–9.59 p.m. = hour 2 and so on) and performed a two-way
ANOVA with hour and year as the independent variables, and number of reported street
violence as the dependent variable. Only the hour-group, F(7, 1072)=15.82, MSE=.22,
p=.00, η=.31 showed main effect. When holding the other factors fixed, the year-group
showed no significant main effect and no significant interaction effects occurred.
Levels of street violence per hours, and by year in the §3 area, is presented in Fig. 3. The
graph shows that the number of reported street violence in the city centre is fairly similar at
all hours between the two groups (periods of measuring), except for hour 7, between 2 a.m.
and 3 a. m., where the crime rates are lower during the years of interventions (i.e.
2010/2011), as would be expected because of the more structured hot spot patrolling during
this hour. However, this difference was not statistically significant. The pattern at 2 a.m.,
when the PSG’s were positioned to cover as many hot spots as possible, is very interesting as
this could indicate that with a clearer hot spot policing structure and focus in the implemen-
tation, the intervention might have shown different overall results.
4 There are no registers of alcohol serving permits prior to 2009 as the municipal government does not keep
these numbers on file as a rule.
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Discussion
The results of the study show no significant changes in the number of reported street
violence before and during the hot spot policing intervention using private security guard
patrols with the purpose to prevent this type of crime. However, we show indications of
effects in that the decreases in reported street violence are larger at certain points in time,
when the security guards used a more structured hot spot policing approach. Thus, the
conclusions of the evaluation are that either there are no effects of the intervention, or that
there are weak but non-significant effects of the intervention, and if implemented differently
it may be possible to get stronger effects.
Implementing Hot Spot Policing
In general, evaluations of hot spot policing efforts show good results with decreasing crime
rates (Braga 2001, 2005; Braga and Bond 2008; Braga et al. 1999; Braga and Weisburd
2011; Koper 1995; Sherman 1990; Sherman and Weisburd 1995; Weisburd and Green 1995;
Weisburd et al. 2009). However, there are also some previous evaluations of directed patrol
interventions that show small or non-significant effects on both crimes in general, as well as
on violent crime in particular. In the light of previous research and theories on which place-
based crime prevention efforts rest, the non-significant results of the present study are not
necessarily surprising. The indication is rather that results might be altered if the intervention
was implemented under different circumstances, mainly regarding dosage and structure. The
planning and implementation of the PSG intervention is key when discussing the results of
the evaluation. Apart from the knowledge of actual crime rates in the city centre the project
lacked a scientific knowledge base concerning implementation of this type of crime preven-
tion efforts. This resulted in two general flaws in the implementation: lack of structure in the
PSG’s task and low patrol intensity/dosage.
Implementation can have a significant impact on the outcome of a program, both when





























Fig. 3 Number of reported street violence in 3 areas, hour per hour weekends 8 p.m. – 4 a.m. 2008/2009
(control years) and 2010/2011 (intervention years)
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the intervention has contained, all the detailed elements of the program that has been
delivered, in order to be able to draw adequate conclusions about the outcomes. One issue
in implementing a new intervention is quality, which relates to how clearly and correctly the
intervention has been conducted (Durlak and DuPre 2008). Lack of clear structure and
instructions on how to execute the task at hand should, logically, make it harder to follow the
program as it is unclear what the essential components are. Hot spot policing implicates
extensive focus on small, well-limited areas as targets for an intervention. Essential compo-
nents in one such intervention could therefore, for example, concern where the main hot
spots are, how to patrol them and the amount of time to be spent in each hot spot, in order to
achieve the desired effects. These factors were never clarified prior to the implementation of
the §3 intervention, increasing the risk that the intervention was not conducted with as good
of quality as might have been possible with better structure.
Dosage and patrol intensity are issues that relate to the quality and the structure of the
implementation. As mentioned previously, hot spot policing as a crime prevention approach
focuses, by definition, on micro-places of crime (Braga and Weisburd 2010b; Groff et al.
2010; Weisburd and Green 1995). In the Örebro §3 case, a rather large area (0,7 km2,
1/4 mi2) was included for the intervention. The intervention area in Örebro encircled not
only several hot spots, but also several calmer parts without any hot spots of street violence.
Since there were no clear, specific guidelines for the PSG’s to work according to, there is no
way of knowing where they spent time patrolling, how long they spent in each hot spot
within the area, if the entire area (all hot spots) was covered to a satisfying level and so on.
For example, if both pairs of guards spent a lot of time in the same part of the area this would
suggest that significant parts of the city centre were not covered during these times. Large
areas and few patrols together give limited dosage of patrolling in each hot spot. This might
mean that the amount of patrolling in each hot spot might not reach adequate levels,
compared to what is suggested in previous research (Koper 1995; Ratcliffe et al. 2010).
The effort in Jackson, Florida (Taylor et al. 2011) led to a decrease of violent crime but had
no statistically significant effects; dosage of patrols in hot spots is pointed out as a possible
contributing factor to modest results of place-based interventions. Dosage and area size are
also brought up in relation to interventions with significant effects in Philadelphia (Ratcliffe
et al. 2010). Directed patrol interventions have been conducted on larger areas and showed
positive results. In the Michigan evaluation (Trojanowicz 1986) the results show significant
effects, but the changes in crime prevalence are not as large as in the other examples, hot
spot policing emphasizes micro-places of crime. If fully adopting this idea, area size and
intensity of patrolling are important components of place-based interventions. Thus, inter-
ventions of this kind implemented on larger areas probably will not show as substantial
changes in crime rates, which might be one reason why the §3 project shows no statistically
significant changes in street violence during the intervention.
One thing in this Örebro §3 study, that might indicate that with better structure in
planning and implementation the outcomes could have been different, is the pattern illus-
trated in the additional analysis of the hour by hour-crime rates. Despite non-significant
results when analysing differences in differences at the separate hours, the tendency seems to
be that street violence decreases at the clubs’ closing time in 2010/2011, where crime
increased in 2008/2009. This could mean that increased hot spot policing structure leads
to better results, because we see larger decreases in reported street violence when the guards
focus their patrolling on micro-places. Or it could simply be an indication that the guards
only have the possibility of making a difference out in the streets at specific times during the
evening, times when large amounts of people move about outside. The latter thought is also
consistent with the concept of alcohol-related street violence as friction crime. Both
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hypotheses indicate that if the implementation were to be more intensively focused on
specific hot spots and hot times, this could lead to better outcomes of the intervention,
and maybe even statistically significant changes in crime rates. This conclusion would also
be consistent with the argument about quality and importance of details and structure when
implementing an intervention (c.f.Durlak and DuPre 2008), which strengthens the hypoth-
esis that the lack of structure in the implementation might have affected the outcome.
Another implementation-related issue concerns the type of uniform the directed patrol-
intervention used in the §3 project. Even though private security is a common feature in
policing today, both private and public, (see e.g. Berkley and Thayer 2000; De Waard 1999;
Shearing and Stenning, 1983) their uniforms might simply not have the same deterrent effect
as a police uniform, which would then undermine the security guards’ authority, making it
harder for them to maintain order and perhaps to affect possible offenders. If this is true, the
fact that security guards, rather than police, patrolled the city centre, might also have
influenced the outcome.
Third Party Policing
Third party policing implies that the police engage other actors in the community to take part
in attempts to control, or prevent, crime (Buerger and Green Mazerolle 1998) and in this
way, the current intervention may be taken for a third party policing intervention since the
police did engage security guards. However, we would argue that the current project is best
framed and defined as a hot spot policing intervention because it targets specific high-crime
places and because the security guards in the intervention have the same rights to interfere as
the police, and, finally, policing, in the sense of executing social control, is not necessarily
done by the police, but can be executed by other actors in society (see e.g. Reiner 2010).
Limitations in the Örebro §3 Study
First of all the research design is a limitation. An experimental research design, with
randomized sampling and control groups for comparison, is the preferred way of testing
for causality when evaluating the outcome of an intervention of some sort. However, this
research design is not applicable in all cases. It is, for example, hard to randomly assign
place-based interventions to different places, when the key in such interventions is the
specific context of a place. It is hard to find equivalent areas for comparison, and almost
impossible to find areas that are exactly the same as the intervention area(s) (c.f.Eck 2002).
This was an issue in the Örebro §3 study, making it impossible to do a rigorous, experi-
mental evaluation of the security guard intervention. Also, researchers were involved late in
the implementation process and had no possibility to plan an evaluation prior to the
intervention, which excluded other types of research designs as well. Late involvement of
evaluators was also a contributing factor to the lack of structure and documentation in the
intervention, as a rigorous evaluation was not planned for initially by the executors.
A very important issue in place-based crime prevention is displacement. Displacement of
crime as a result of a place-based intervention can compromise the results of such an
intervention, meaning that crime does, despite lower crime rates in the intervention area,
not decrease in total as it just “moves around the corner” (see, e.g. Bowers et al. 2011; Gabor
1990; Guerette 2009; Guerette and Bowers 2009; Hesseling 1994). That is, crime rates
decrease in the intervention area as a result of the intervention, but crime rates in surrounding
so called catchment areas, increase during the same period. In the §3 study we had no
opportunity to measure any potential displacement effects as surrounding areas do not
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compare to the city centre as places that attract the observed crime type. There are, for
example, few or no nightclubs or night-open restaurants in these areas. As a result we did not
have access to data needed for an analysis of crime displacement.
In our case it was also a challenge to do before- and after-tests of crime rates in the
intervention area, as the intervention time period (summer weekends) stands out during the
year as an active period of street violence. As a solution, it would be of interest to measure crime
rates in the intervention area during the same time period one summer without intervention, to
see whether the crime rates increase without the security guards in place. This has, however, not
been possible to do, as the intervention was implemented again during the summer of 2012.
Strengths in the Örebro §3 Study
As an experimental effect evaluation was not possible, we decided to use the intervention area
as its own control, measuring crime rates in this area prior to, and during, the intervention.
When adapting a quasi-experimental approach or doing a follow-up study, which is the case
in the present study, it is important to be systematic and to eliminate as many plausible
alternative hypotheses as possible (Eck 2002; Farrington 1987). There are some commonly
occurring factors that might influence the outcome in non-experimental studies, that need to
be paid attention, in order to strengthen the internal validity of the study as much as possible
(Farrington 1987), and that we have considered here. First, can the measured decrease in
crime simply reflect a normal fluctuation in crime rates? Our results might indicate that this is
the case, as the decrease is statistically non-significant. However, the hour-by-hour analysis
shows a larger decrease at certain points in time, indicating that better results of the
intervention might be possible with a more structured implementation. These indications
are in line with previous research on directed patrol interventions. Second, does the outcome
reflect differences between different areas, or changes in the intervention area? In the §3 study
we used only one area for comparison. In this area we tested for confounders likely to
influence the street violence rates: number of establishments in the city centre with alcohol
serving permits, disturbances in hot spots, and weather. The results of these tests showed that
the confounders had no implications for the outcomes of the intervention. Third, does the
outcome reflect a pre-existing, decreasing trend? We collected data for 7 years (2005–2011,
previously presented in Fig. 2), which shows that street violence rates in Örebro has
fluctuated during these years, indicating that there was no consistent trend prior to the
intervention. Fourth, does the decrease reflect changes in measurement methods? We used
police records for reported crime for all years of measuring. However, the human factor is an
important part of the police report registers as insufficient documentation concerning place
and time could have caused incidents that should be included in the study to be sorted out. In
this case 4.4 % of the original data set was excluded due to the lack of information regarding
time and place of the crimes in the reports. With the low crime rates these missing data might
be enough to have a small impact on the results. Fifth, was the intervention implemented after
a period with unusually high crime rates? In 2009 the crime rates were a bit higher than
previous years. We handled this by merging data for 2008 and 2009 into the control group, in
order to even out some of the fluctuation between the years prior to the intervention.
Proper, experimental, effect evaluations of hot spot policing and directed patrol are scarce
in other parts of the world than America. To our knowledge there are no evaluations of
security guard interventions aiming to prevent street violence. Even systematic follow-ups of
directed patrol interventions in general, with our level of strictness and systematicity, are
rare. So, despite the somewhat flawed research design in the Örebro §3 study, there is a need
for studies of this sort, both concerning the type of intervention and the context.
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Future Directions
The results of the present study touches on questions concerning what works, when and where,
that still have not been addressed to a satisfying extent by previous research. Knowledge is still
lacking regarding the potential of hot spot policing interventions using directed patrol. In
summary, more knowledge is needed, not only regarding what works on what and when, but
also about whether hot spot policing is an adequate approach in all hot spots of crime.
Open Access This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License which
permits any use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original author(s) and the source
are credited.
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